Capital budgeting frequently involves multiple stages at which firms can continue or abandon ongoing projects. In this paper, we study a project requiring two stages of investment. Failure to fund Stage 1 of the investment precludes investment in Stage 2, whereas failure to fund Stage 2 results in early termination. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the firm can limit the manager's informational rents with the early termination of the project. In this setting, we find that the firm optimally commits to a capital allocation scheme whereby it forgoes positive net present value (NPV) projects at Stage 1 (capital rationing), whereas at Stage 2, depending on the manager's previous report, it sometimes implements projects with a negative continuation NPV but in other situations forgoes implementing projects with positive continuation NPVs. Capital budgeting frequently involves multiple stages at which firms can continue or abandon ongoing projects. In this paper, we study a project requiring two stages of investment. Failure to fund Stage 1 of the investment precludes investment in Stage 2, whereas failure to fund Stage 2 results in early termina--tion. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the firm can limit the manager's informational rents with the early termination of the project. In this setting, we find that the firm optimally commits to a capital allocation scheme whereby it foregoes positive NPV projects at Stage 1 (capital rationing), while at Stage 2, depending on the manager's previous report, it sometimes implements projects with a negative continuation NPV but in other situations foregoes implementing projects with positive continu--ation NPVs.
I. Introduction
In the presence of privately--informed managers, a firm's capital budgeting policies balance investment efficiency against informational rents, or slack, such as managers' consumption of perquisites. To limit the opportunities for managers to divert capital funds for private benefit, firms use their managerial ac--counting systems as well as audits of their capital projects. For example, these systems can easily un--cover, and thereby preclude, the manager's diversion of capital funds from appropriate investments to private uses such as vacations or excess compensation. However, it is more difficult for these systems to distinguish between investments in necessary and unnecessary assets, provided that both fall within the general class of appropriate purchases. For instance, it may be difficult to detect that a manager is en--gaging in empire building (acquiring unnecessary hard assets such as research equipment, cars, or offic--es; or unnecessary soft assets such as staff and consulting services) from which he derives private bene--fits. Thus, at best the firm's accounting and auditing systems may mitigate a manager's informational rent by constraining the set of assets into which he can divert capital funds for private benefit. One pos--sible implication of restricting investment to specific asset classes is that the private benefit provided to the manager can be consumed over time. For example, the private benefit of lavish offices is consumed over the time that the manager actually uses these offices (as compared to excess compensation or va--cations whose benefits are consumed immediately). As a result of constraining a manager's asset diver--sions, a principal can deny the manager the full consumption of such private benefits by abandoning the project before completion. However, by abandoning the project, the principal may be unable to fully re--coup her initial investment. We study the implications of this abandonment option and "delayed slack consumption" on optimal capital allocation schemes.
We consider a multi--stage capital budgeting setting in which a privately--informed manager proposes an initial research budget to develop a new project that the principal either accepts or rejects. If the princi--pal accepts, the funds are made available to the manager who engages in the research required to dis--cover the feasibility and net benefit of implementing the project of interest. If the research stage is suc--cessful, the continuation value of the project becomes known to both the principal and manager at the end of Stage 1. The principal determines whether to implement or abandon the project in Stage 2. Con--sistent with the above discussion, we assume that the manager cannot consume all the slack in Stage 1 that may arise from the investment. As a result, if the project is abandoned at Stage 2 the manager fore--goes consuming some of the associated informational rent. Likewise, if the project is abandoned at Stage 2, the principal cannot fully recoup her initial investment. Thus, if the investment is abandoned, a deadweight loss is incurred. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the early abandonment of the project leads to the manager consuming no slack and the principal receiving a zero salvage value for his Stage 1 investment.
Our model of "delayed slack consumption" gives rise to an optimal capital allocation scheme that is qualitatively different from that found in the previous literature but is consistent with empirical findings.
For example, we find that while the optimal capital allocation scheme uses a single Stage 1 hurdle rate that results in under--investment or capital rationing at Stage 1 (the research stage), at Stage 2 it applies different hurdle rates depending on the manager's previous Stage 1 cost report and the outcome of his Stage 1 research. In fact, we find that it is optimal for the principal to commit to continue some projects at Stage 2 even if they have a negative continuation value (i.e., Stage 2 over--investment), while it is also optimal to commit to forego other projects that have a positive continuation value (i.e., Stage 2 under--investment). Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence of both over and under--investment across firms found by Richardson (2006) and Driver and Temple (2009) . However, our results are most closely related to Poterba and Summers (1995) who find multiple hurdle rates within individual firms, some of which are below and some of which are above their cost of capital.
While our model is descriptive of a large class of capital budgeting problems, we believe that it is partic--ularly descriptive of the capital budgeting process for R&D projects that tend to span multiple stages; require highly--specialized investments whose salvage values, if abandoned early, are significantly lower than their initial costs; and for which the general categories of assets to be funded can be agreed upon ahead of time and audited. For example, R&D investments often require multiple investment stages be--cause additional technological information (regarding cost, reliability and scalability) or market infor--mation (regarding availability of suppliers or demand) can only be acquired after constructing a proto--type plant or product.
1 Another applicable R&D setting is one where regulatory obligations must be sat--isfied sequentially; as is the case with newly developed drugs undergoing FDA approval.
II. Literature Review
Our paper builds on the single--period, adverse selection capital budgeting model of Antle and Eppen (1985) in which the project cost is commonly known, but the rate of return is privately known by the manager. Because the manager can immediately consume any allocated funds above and beyond those required for the project, his incentive is always to understate the project's true rate of return. To miti--gate the manager's misreporting incentives, the optimal capital allocation scheme provides the same budget for all projects and specifies a single required rate of return or hurdle rate that exceeds the firm's cost of capital, causing the firm to forego some positive NPV projects (i.e., under--invest). 2 Antle and Fellingham (1990) , Fellingham and Young (1990) and Arya et al. (1994) extend the model to a repeated game, where the manager privately observes and reports on a new and independent invest--ment opportunity in each period. Similarly, Antle et al. (2006) considers the value of giving the privately--informed manager an option to postpone the investment to a later period at which time he may discov--er and report on a new and unrelated investment opportunity. In contrast, we consider projects where the Stage 2 investment opportunity only arises if the firm invested in Stage 1; i.e., the former can be viewed as a continuation of the latter. Furthermore, the above--mentioned literature assumes that the manager can immediately consume any slack provided by the principal, whereas we assume that the manager consumes the slack across multiple stages.
Most closely related to our work is the abandonment options literature. Levitt and Snyder (1997) con--siders a two--stage setting where the manager is subject to moral hazard in Stage 1, and his efforts affect both an interim signal received between the two stages, and the likelihood of the project succeeding at the end of Stage 2.
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If the principal abandons the project upon receiving the interim signal, she elimi--nates the possibility of conditioning the manager's compensation on the project outcome, thereby ex--acerbating the Stage 1 moral hazard problem. Consequently, the principal optimally continues projects with a negative continuation value (over--invests) when the Stage 1 moral hazard problem is sufficiently severe.
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Unlike Levitt and Snyder (1997) , we find instances of both under--and over--investment. Further, because the manager in our model takes no productive actions but has private information, the principal uses her Stage 2 abandonment/continuation decision to control the manager's Stage 1 reporting incen--tives.
2 Bockem and Schiller (2009) finds report contingent budgets which are used to motivate the manager to engage in costly information gathering. A similar extension is considered in Kim (2006) . 3 We thank an anonymous referee for referring us to Levitt and Snyder (1997) .
4 Dutta and Fan (2009) and Bernardo et al (2009) also study moral hazard models which give rise to instances of over--investment.
The structure of our model is most closely related to that of Pfeiffer and Schneider (2007) . In both pa--pers, the principal makes a Stage 1 investment decision based on the manager's report and later makes her Stage 2 continuation decision based on information revealed at Stage 2.
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The major difference be--tween our paper and Pfeiffer and Schneider (2007) concerns the informational rent. In Pfeiffer and Schneider (2007) the principal incurs an informational rent (and the manager consumes it) only if the project is continued. 6 In our model, the principal incurs the informational rent upfront at the time of the Stage 1 funding. If the project is not continued, there is a deadweight loss in that the principal has al--ready incurred the informational rent but the manager cannot consume it.
Our finding of Stage 2 over--investment is also related to the literature on "escalation errors" (Staw 1976 and Berg et al. 2009 ). This literature identifies settings in which a person who has previously invested in a project subsequently finds out that the continuation value of the project is negative but still chooses not to abandon it, resulting in over--investment. Kanodia et al. (1989) provides a rational economic ex--planation for such behavior based on reputational concerns. In that model, abandoning the project would indicate that the person did not have "foresight" at the time he initially invested in the project, causing the labor market to revise downward his value and future outside opportunity wage. The pre--sent paper and Kanodia et al. (1989) explain two very different over--investment phenomena. Kanodia et al. (1989) examines a single actor -labor market setting in which it is optimal for the single actor to con--tinue a negative NPV project. The present paper examines an optimal contracting, principal--agent set--ting, in which it is optimal for the principal to commit to continue a negative NPV project in order to mit--igate the manager's Stage 1 reporting incentives.
III. Model
We study an adverse selection model encompassing two stages. At Stage 1, the manager requests a budget to investigate a potential new project. The cost required to successfully conduct this investiga--tion is privately known by the manager. If funded, the manager's investigative or research work gener-- 5 The interim signal is privately observed by the manager in Pfeiffer and Schneider (2007) , whereas it is publicly ob--served in our model. 6 Further, in Pfeiffer and Schneider (2007) the abandonment decision creates information in the sense that it al--lows the principal to perfectly observe the agent's subsequent effort choice. In contrast, in Arya and Glover (2003) abandonment destroys information about the agent's prior choice of effort. In our model, the Stage 2 decision has no effect on the information available to the principal. as "funding" research and an investment in Stage 2 as "implementing" the project.
The timeline is as follows (see Figure 1) . At time t=1 a risk--neutral firm (the principal) hires a risk--neutral manager to oversee the research activity associated with a potential new project. The principal offers a contract to the manager that fully specifies the compensation scheme and capital budgeting rules (as discussed below). At t=0, prior to being hired, the manager privately observes the level of funding re--quired to conduct the research in Stage 1. We assume that the research stage requires a minimum in--
, where To facilitate the ex--position, we assume that the discrete costs, i c , are evenly spaced, with
and that these costs are uniformly distributed: ( )
The assumptions placed on the probability distributions of the Stage 1 costs and Stage 2 continuation values significantly simplify the characteriza--7 The ordering of c i 's and g j 's implies that the principal prefers smaller indices for both c i and g j . 8 The model could also accommodate correlated random variables, c and g, although doing so would complicate the interpretation of our results, as one would then have to distinguish between the effects caused by statistical dependence versus those arising from the delayed consumption of slack. tion of the manager's informational rent. However, we believe that all qualitative results would continue to hold with more general distributions.
We next specify the budgeting and compensation processes. At time t=2, the manager uses his private information to submit a report, ˆi c , to the principal regarding his research costs and the latter funds the project according to the contract agreed to at time t=1: with probability ( ) [ ] As a managerial example of our setting, consider a firm that is interested in entering a new geographical market with uncertain market potential. The firm decides to delay the large upfront costs required to fully enter the market by hiring a manager to conduct a trial experiment in a representative fraction of the market. To do so, the manager needs to hire people familiar with the new market and invest in facil--ities. The manager is privately informed as to the cost of running the trial. While the firm can audit the manager's spending, it cannot distinguish between necessary and excessive investments in people and facilities. The manager can only consume the full private benefits provided by excess Stage 1 funding if the trial is successful and the firm decides to fully enter the market. Again, if the project is abandoned, the salvage value of the unconsumed assets is likely to be zero.
Although we have outlined an extensive list of assumptions above, the three critical assumptions re--quired for our results are: (1) the manager does not consume all the slack in Stage 1; (2) the principal cannot recoup all of the unconsumed funding if the project is abandoned; and (3) the principal and manager cannot contract on the price of salvaged assets if the project is abandoned. Assumptions (1) and (2) guarantee that a deadweight loss is incurred if the project is abandoned, whereas ( 
, 1, , Note that the structure of the optimal Stage 1 funding rule is the same as in the Antle--Eppen (1985) model, because the sequential rationality of the Stage 2 implementation decision makes the Stage 1 funding decision essentially a one--period problem. Comparing our results with those obtained in the No--Commitment model will thus allow us to compare our results with the prior literature and to isolate the roles of delayed slack consumption and commitment in the optimal capital allocation rule.
V. Commitment Model Results
Returning to our Commitment model, and again invoking the Revelation Principle, the manager's ex--pected utility upon observing Stage 1 cost i c is given by: 
, 1, ,
Note that because the principal can now commit to a Stage 2 implementation rule, the sequential ra--tionality constraints from the No--Commitment problem can be dropped. The manager's Truth--Telling constraints, (TT C ), ensure that the manager truthfully reports his cost, i c . The manager's Individual Ra--tionality constraints, (IR C ), guarantee that the manager receives sufficient funds to conduct his Stage 1 research whenever the principal agrees to fund it.
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Conditional on a Stage 1 cost i c , the manager's ex--pected utility only depends on the interim information, j g , to the extent that it affects the probability of implementing the project in Stage 2, or equivalently, the probability that he consumes his informa--
Without loss of generality, we ignore the possibility that the principal compensates the manager when: (a) the principal does not invest in the research stage and (b) the principal does invest in the research stage, but chooses not implement the project. The proof of this assertion is relatively long but follows from the assumed risk--neutrality of the manager and lack of any additional agency problems. 
, which yields the optimal budgets, − in our case) were he to win with a bid i b , against the probability of winning with that bid ( i p ). Although the probability of "winning" an auction is exogenously determined by the distribution of bidders but is optimally chosen by the principal in our setting, the tradeoffs the bidder/manager face are identical.
As (iii) points out, Stage 2 implementation follows a (Stage 1 report--contingent) hurdle policy in that all projects with a continuation value below the hurdle, * i w g , are abandoned and projects with a continua--tion value strictly greater than the hurdle are implemented with probability 1. Because of the assumed discreteness of j g , projects whose continuation value is exactly the hurdle may be implemented with a probability less than 1.
To further isolate the role of delayed slack consumption, the following proposition compares the Stage 1 relative efficiency between our model and both the First--Best and No--Commitment benchmarks. 
From the principal's objective function it is straightforward that the more Stage 1 projects that are funded, the more slack the principal has to provide the managers, as the last term in brackets increases in h * . Furthermore, changing the implementation probability , i j p has three effects for the principal, one 13
Over--investment from the principal's point of view and the society's point of view are identical under First--Best. In the No--Commitment model and in our model, over--investment from the principal's point of view occurs when any project with a negative continuation value is implemented. This need not be over--investment from a social welfare point of view because the loss to the principal from continuing a negative continuation value project may be compensated by the slack which the agent gains from such implementation. We define over--investment from the principal's point of view. Note that this is consistent with what empiricists are able to document, as the slack arising from earlier stage investments cannot be observed. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. direct and two indirect. These three effect can be seen in the principal's marginal payoff to raising the implementation probability , i j p , holding fixed the number of funded managers, h * :
By changing , i j p , the principal changes the probability with which she implements a project with con--tinuation value j g . For a positive continuation value, increasing , when increasing the probability of implementation for manager i c , the principal must also increase the informational rents paid to for all managers whose cost is less than i c . That is, by increasing the imple--mentation probability for one manager, the payoff to over--reporting increases for all managers with lower Stage 1 cost, therefore the principal must also increase the rents paid to them to maintain their truth--telling incentives.
Taking these three effects together illustrates how the optimal allocation rule may result in Stage 2 over-- 
Recall that in our model there is a deadweight loss from abandonment. The first indirect effect, which
gives rise to over--investment, is entirely caused by this deadweight loss. To see this formally, suppose 
To further show how the direct and indirect effects discussed above interact, we next consider the ef--fect of an exogenous shock to a single Stage 2 continuation value j g on the implementation probabili--ties. The above discussed first--order condition 14 If 3 0 g > and 4 0 g < , then this change results in optimal over--investment for 1 c .
VI. Conclusion
Capital investment decisions often involve multiple stages. Such investments are particularly prone to problems of adverse selection, because the firm must initially rely on managers with relevant prior ex--perience or expertise. These informed managers thus stand to collect informational rents. We highlight the role that abandonment options and the delayed consumption of slack have on the optimal design of capital allocation schemes. These features result in an optimal allocation scheme that has several inter--esting features. First, the budgets allocated at Stage 1 increase in the manager's cost report, unlike the previous literature. Second, while we find a single Stage 1 hurdle rate that exceeds the firm's cost of capital, as in the previous literature, we find that Stage 2 optimally exhibits multiple hurdle rates (some above and some below the firm's cost of capital) that depend on the manager's Stage 1 cost report and the outcome of the Stage 1 research. The multiple hurdle rates in Stage 2 are consistent with findings in Poterba and Summers (1995) .
Our model makes a number of assumptions. For example, we assume that the interim information available at Stage 2 is independent of the manager's Stage 1 cost. If instead, the manager's cost infor--mation is correlated with the Stage 2 continuation cost, then the principal could further reduce the manager's informational rents by exploiting this statistical relation. However, to the extent that the Stage 2 information does not perfectly reveal the manager's cost, then the same tensions examined in this study would continue to hold.
Our formulation also assumes that the manager only derives utility from excessive investment in assets if the project is implemented in Stage 2 and that the salvage value of the Stage 1 investment is zero if the project is abandoned. While these assumptions are relatively strong, they are not critical to our re--sults. All of our results continue to hold provided that (1) at least part of the manager's slack consump--tion depends on the project implementation and that (2) at least part of the remaining slack cannot be recouped by the principal if the project is abandoned. In other words, a necessary condition for our find--ings is that there be a deadweight loss associated with the Stage 1 funding (unconsumed excess assets), and that the deadweight loss depend on the manager's reported cost. Thus in addition to the traditional tradeoff between production efficiencies and informational rents, our principal is also concerned with the deadweight loss attributed to the cancelation of previously funded projects.
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Another assumption is that while the manager privately observes the Stage 1 cost, the Stage 2 infor--mation is publicly observed. As long as the manager cannot leave the firm after having observed the Stage 2 information (as in Pfeiffer and Schneider 2007), he would not earn any rents on that private in--formation and our results would continue to hold. If instead the manager could leave, the principal would design the contract to limit the additional informational rents, thereby introducing additional dis--tortions. Alternatively, if the principal privately observes the continuation value, her ability to commit to a multi--stage funding rule would be limited, possibly leading to the use of implicit contracts. 
(ii Optimal budgets) We first show that expected rents are strictly decreasing in the reported cost, ˆi c .
We then prove that the upward (TT C ) constraints must bind in equilibrium, which enables us to derive the optimal budgets. We next show that only the adjacent upward (TT C ) constraints bind at optimality. First, it is straight--forward to establish that satisfying the adjacent upward constraints implies that all other upward con--straints are satisfied provided that the budgets are monotonic (which was shown above). In addition, it is also straightforward to show that, given that the i p 's are weakly decreasing, satisfying the upward constraints implies that the downward constraints are also satisfied. Accordingly, we restrict our atten-- 
. Solving iteratively,
we obtain:
To see that the adjacent upward (TT C ) constraints must bind, suppose that the (TT C ) constraint for a manager truthfully reporting i c does not bind; i.e., ( A proof that the first--order approach yields a maximum is available from the authors upon request. 
Define the principal's utility as a function of the implementation probability vector 
Part (i)
We first show that over--investment relative to First--Best in Stage 1 is never optimal. 
The marginal benefit attributed to the decreased number of funded projects in the Commitment model is given by: First note that adding an additional manager in the NC model yields incremental profit to the principal of ( ) Define the proposed probability vector ( ) To complete the proof, we demonstrate that the incremental cost of funding an additional manager in the NC setting, ( ) 
Our assumption of discrete, rather than continuous, costs simplifies the search for, s , the smallest index, such that * NC s p p ≥ . Further, our assumption of uniformly distributed costs simplifies the construction of an 1 h + probability vector, ( ) 1 P h + , which attains the same incremental revenues as the NC model.
The fact that the proposed probability vector, ( ) 1 P h + , uses the same implementation probabilities as the term in brackets is non--negative, therefore
